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Abstract
Background: Nonattendance at scheduled appointments in public hospitals presents a challenge for efficient
resource use and may ultimately affect health outcomes due to longer waiting times. Seven percent of all
scheduled outpatient appointments in the United Kingdom are estimated to be nonattended. Various reminder
systems have been shown to moderately reduce nonattendance, although the effect of issuing fines for
nonattendance has not yet been tested in a randomized context. However, such use of financial incentives could
impact access to care differently across the different socioeconomic groups. The aim of this study is to assess the
effect of fines on hospital outpatient nonattendance.
Methods/design: A 1:1 randomized controlled trial of scheduled outpatient appointments was used, with
follow-ups until the date of appointment. The setting is an orthopedic clinic at a regional hospital in Denmark.
Appointments for users who are scheduled for diagnostics, treatment, surgery, or follow-ups were included from
May 2015 to November 2015. Appointments assigned to the intervention arm include an attachment of the
appointment letter explaining that a fine will be issued in the case of nonattendance without prior notice.
Appointments assigned to the control arm follow usual practice (same system but no letter attachment). The
primary outcome is the proportion of nonattendance. Secondary outcomes are proportions of cancellations,
sociodemographics, and health-problem characteristics. Furthermore, the intervention costs and production value
of nonattended appointments will be measured. An analysis of effect and cost-effectiveness will be conducted
based on a 5 % significance level.
Discussion: The study is initiated and funded by the Danish Regions, which have the responsibility for the Danish
public healthcare sector. The results are expected to inform future decisions about the introduction of fines for
nonattendance at public hospitals.
Trial registration: Current Controlled Trials, ISRCTN61925912. Registered on 6 July 2015.
Keywords: Fine, Nonattendance, Access to care, Outpatient clinic, Randomized controlled trial
Background
Recent hospital episode statistics from the United King-
dom show that approximately 20 % of scheduled out-
patient appointments are nonattended [1]. While
hospital and user cancellations each account for almost
one third of the nonattended appointments, 7 % of non-
attended appointments remain unaccounted for. Seven
percent nonattendance is estimated to represent a cost
to the healthcare system of around £790 million per year
in the United Kingdom [2].
Outpatient nonattendance refers to the phenomenon
of users who have an appointment but do not show up
at the specified date, time, and location without giving
notice. In addition to affecting the efficiency of produc-
tion and thereby increasing the total costs of care, non-
attendance might also delay access to care for users on
waiting lists. Moreover, nonattendance has been sug-
gested to have a detrimental effect on health outcomes
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[3, 4], an effect that is unevenly distributed across dis-
ease and socioeconomic groups [5, 6].
Stubbs et al. conducted a systematic literature review
to assess the efficacy of various reminder interventions
for reducing outpatient nonattendance such as tele-
phone, mail, text/short message service, e-mail re-
minders, and open-access scheduling [7]. They found
that almost all of the assessed interventions moderately
reduced nonattendance. However, much of this evidence
was based on observational studies, and most studies
did not control for socioeconomic status and other rele-
vant factors such as age, sex, waiting time, and health-
problem characteristics. The recognition of a need for
further high-quality studies has been confirmed by simi-
lar systematic reviews [8–10].
Another means for reducing outpatient nonatten-
dance, for which there appears to be only vague empir-
ical evidence, is to penalize nonattendance by a fine.
According to neoclassical economic theory, user behav-
ior can be influenced by financial incentives. The intro-
duction of a fine for nonattendance will create a
stronger incentive for users to appear at their scheduled
appointments [11]. This has been demonstrated in two
earlier observational studies where the introduction of
fines led to a 14 % reduction and a 54 % reduction in
nonattendance [12, 13]. These studies, however, only
represent before-and-after scenarios, do not consider the
likely influence of exogenous factors, and have limited
sample sizes. Furthermore, the external validity is ques-
tionable due to the 20-year time lag.
In Denmark, the introduction of fines for nonatten-
dance in hospital outpatient clinics has been debated for
years [14]. In 2005, a collaborative agreement between
the Danish Regions and the Danish Medical Association
opened the opportunity for privately practicing special-
ists to issue nonattendance fines of Danish kroner
(DKK) 250 for consultations and DKK 500 for surgical
procedures (1 EUR = 7.45 DKK) [15]. Overall, the ex-
pected benefits were related to a better use of resources,
whereas concerns were expressed about the detrimental
effect on equal access for equal needs, as the fines would
impact the most vulnerable users most strongly. More-
over, the use of fines was seen as a break with the funda-
mental value of free and equal access to healthcare and a
potential threat to the patient-health professional rela-
tionship, which ideally should be independent of finan-
cial interests [14].
Although 10 years have passed since the regulatory
context cleared the way for fines in the Danish health-
care system for privately practicing specialists, no sys-
tematic evidence on the resulting practice, efficacy, or
effect appears to have been reported. Therefore, the Da-
nish Regions have decided that the effect of using fines
to moderate nonattendance at somatic, hospital-based,
outpatient clinics in Denmark should be scientifically in-
vestigated [16]. This trial is a result of that decision and,
in accordance, the aim of this trial is to investigate the
effect of fines on nonattendance in a hospital-based out-
patient clinic. The primary hypothesis is that the risk of
fines will incentivize healthcare-service users to attend
appointments more often than if no risk of fines is asso-
ciated with nonattendance of a planned appointment. A
secondary hypothesis is that the pattern of attendance
will be affected by the risk of fines in terms of who at-
tends (user characteristics) and what type of appoint-
ment is being attended (appointment characteristics).
The rationale for the second hypothesis is to address the
political focus on preserving equal access to healthcare
and on variation in provider efficiency. Finally, a third
hypothesis is that the use of fines in routine practice will
be cost effective.
Methods/design
A randomized controlled trial (RCT) will be conducted
at a hospital-based orthopedic outpatient clinic in the
Central Denmark Region. Randomization to an interven-
tion arm (risk of fine) or to a control arm (no risk of
fine) will be undertaken at the appointment level, start-
ing in May 2015 and proceeding for 7 months. The trial
conduct, analysis, and reporting will be in accordance
with the Standard Protocol Items: Recommendations for
Interventional Trials (SPIRIT) guidance 2013 [17] and
the Consolidated Standards Of Reporting Trials (CON-
SORT) statement [18].
Setting
The Department of Orthopedic Surgery at Viborg Re-
gional Hospital consists of an outpatient clinic and a
ward. The outpatient clinic has 18,500 scheduled ap-
pointments a year, of which approximately 19 % are can-
celled and 5 % are nonattended (see Table 1). Medical
secretaries manage the booking via an electronic book-
ing system that automatically generates appointment let-
ters that are sent to users. Apart from this system, a
substantial number of appointments are scheduled with-
out a sufficient time lag to allow for the dispersal of ap-
pointment letters (e.g., in cases of acute health
problems) and thus are not considered in the present
study.
Users can call or e-mail to give notice of nonatten-
dance or to have their appointment rescheduled. The
secretary is open for telephone calls between 0745 and
1430 on weekdays and can be contacted via e-mail
24 hours a day/7 days a week. A short message service
(SMS) reminder system is used to prevent nonatten-
dance; however, this can only be used for follow-up ap-
pointments, as the user’s phone number is not available
until an initial visit has been attended or if the user has
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attended the clinic before. Based on historical data, we
expect that 20–30 % of scheduled users will continue re-
ceiving SMS reminders.
Participants
Consecutive users scheduled for diagnostics, treatment,
surgery, or follow-up in the outpatient clinic by appoint-
ment letter sent between 1 May 2015 and 1 December
2015 are included. As a user may have more than one
appointment, only the first appointment during this
period was considered. Users who were issued more
than one appointment letter before the first appointment
date were excluded. Appointments booked without an
appointment letter (e.g., via telephone or face-to-face)
are also excluded from the study. Appointments for
physiotherapy or occupational therapy, which are typic-
ally group-based and scheduled without appointment
letters as well as appointments for users residing in
Greenland (requiring an overseas flight) are similarly
excluded.
Randomization and consent
User-level 1:1 randomization is conducted according to
the time of booking using the electronic patient booking
system (BookPlan via MidtEPJ). The booking system
automatically generates a random number and assigns
the appointment to one of the randomization arms.
These data are kept from the secretary and other health-
care professionals unless the user informs them (e.g., in
the case of questions or complaints). The researchers
will be fully blind throughout the trial and data analysis.
The study was considered a quality-improvement pro-
ject, and informed consent from users was not required
by The Ministry of Health and Prevention (See Ethics
and data protection). However, users were informed of
the risk of receiving a fine on nonattendance at this out-
patient clinic via the media and via posters and booklets
at the hospital. Furthermore, in Denmark, users have
free hospital choice.
Sample size
Based on department statistics, a nonattendance rate of
4.8 % and a volume of 6,500 eligible appointments dur-
ing a time window of 7 months are assumed. This time
window was adopted to balance of arguments concern-
ing effect size and stability in the study, which are
exerted for restructuring and cost cutting after the
7 months. A minimum reduction of 1.58 % (from 4.8 %
to 3.22 %) was found using a chi-squared test and a
90 % power level. The randomization ratio is 1:1, which
indicates that 3,250 users are required in each arm. The
power to detect similar impacts on the secondary out-
come parameters of cancellations will be higher due to
higher baseline proportions. The power to detect the im-
pact on sociodemographics will depend on the scaling
and the relevant level of relative risk reduction [19].
Comparators
All appointments will be made in accordance with the
usual practice except for two aspects. First, the appoint-
ment letter will inform the user (for both the interven-
tion and control arms) about the trial. The letter will
explain that the investigation has been initiated by the
Danish Regions and approved by the Ministry of Health
and that the patient’s appointment has been randomly
assigned to be subject to a fine in the case of
Table 1 Historical number of cancelled (% of scheduled) and nonattended (% of noncancelled) appointments from April 2014 to
March 2015 for the study setting
Cancelled appointments
Scheduled appointments By hospital By user Total Nonattended appointments
April 2014 1,473 187 (13) 95 (6) 282 (19) 55 (5)
May 2014 1,467 223 (15) 105 (7) 328 (22) 64 (6)
June 2014 1,869 307 (16) 94 (5) 401 (21) 83 (6)
July 2014 1,082 175 (16) 66 (6) 241 (22) 50 (6)
August 2014 1,562 262 (17) 52 (3) 314 (20) 68 (5)
September 2014 1,661 270 (16) 151 (9) 421 (25) 62 (5)
October 2014 1,634 208 (13) 223 (14) 431 (26) 41 (3)
November 2014 1,744 205 (12) 89 (5) 294 (17) 71 (5)
December 2014 1,583 190 (12) 52 (3) 242 (15) 62 (5)
January 2015 1,511 166 (11) 30 (2) 196 (13) 60 (5)
February 2015 1,387 118 (9) 36 (3) 154 (11) 48 (4)
March 2015 1,520 147 (10) 44 (3) 191 (13) 50 (4)
Total 18,493 2,458 (13) 1,037 (6) 3,495 (19) 714 (5)
Note: All appointments booked by appointment letter are included (not appointments booked by telephone)
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nonattendance without notice by the patient if a letter
about the fine system is attached to the appointment let-
ter. Second, for appointments randomized to the inter-
vention group only, a letter specifying the conditions for
the fine assessment is attached to the appointment letter.
This letter clearly indicates that a fine will be issued in
the case of nonattendance if the patient does not give
notice prior to the time of the appointment. The pa-
tients are also informed that the fine amounts to DKK
250 and that it will be issued by a central office under
the local government administration (Corporate Finance,
Central Denmark Region), which is open for e-mails and
telephone calls during normal office hours if the patient
has any questions or complaints.
The secretary registers nonattended appointments in
the clinic daily. If a user shows up late, the health pro-
fessionals will usually attempt to see the user anyways. A
list of nonattended appointments will be automatically
sent once a week to the central office administering the
fine system. Similarly, this office will receive the list of
included appointments once a week to handle questions
and complaints. Fines will be issued once a week, and
recipients are given 4 weeks before the fine is due. In
the case of nonpayment, users will receive two re-
minders; thereafter, the collection of the fine will be
handed over to the tax authority (SKAT), which will col-
lect the fine and related expenses.
Measures of effectiveness
The primary outcome measure is the proportion of ap-
pointments that are attended. The secondary outcomes,
which are covariates, include the proportions of sociode-
mographics (age, sex, income, education, distance to
hospital, travel time, and waiting times) and health-
problem characteristics (anatomy, type of appointment
and treatment costs). All parameters except for sociode-
mographics are automatically extracted from the elec-
tronic patient journal system into a trial registry and
administratively registered in electronic trial registries.
Data on sociodemographics are extracted from various,
individual user-level, national registries administered by
Statistics Denmark.
Measures of costs
The opportunity costs are considered from a Danish
healthcare perspective and include the intervention cost
as well as the productivity costs related to nonatten-
dance. Microcosting of the intervention will be used to
estimate the costs of a routine-based system that man-
ages the issuing of fines, questions, complaints, re-
minders, and the handover of claims to the tax
authorities in the case of nonpayment after reminders.
The cost determination will be based on detailed time
registrations made by the central office undertaking the
administration of fines. Time registrations will be inte-
grated in the administrative system at the appointment
level and will be valued using average gross staff salaries.
The cost of utensils will be added to the standard over-
head rate for the administration.
The cost determination of productivity loss due to
nonattendance will be estimated by the production value
of nonattended appointments if they had been attended.
As a worst-case estimate, implying no flexibility of pro-
duction, the full tariffs of the Diagnosis-Related-
Grouping system will be used to value productivity loss.
As a best-case estimate, implying that the production is
almost fully flexible and will simply take the next user in
the case of nonattendance, only a proportion of the pro-
duction value will be used. The relevant levels of the
worst-case and best-case scenarios will be informed from
qualitative and observational studies that are conducted
in another test department, which is fully exposed to the
fine protocol at the departmental level.
It should be noted that revenue from fines is a transfer
of money between taxpayers who do not attend sched-
uled appointments and all other taxpayers (and is not an
economic opportunity cost). However, the revenue net
of the costs for administrating the fine system is consid-
ered for budget impact analysis.
Analysis of effectiveness
The principle of intention-to-treat will be used for ana-
lysis, and each of the outcome parameters will be com-
pared between the intervention and the control groups.
A simple test of proportions will be used to test the pri-
mary hypothesis. The secondary hypotheses will be
tested in two probit regressions: one for user character-
istics and one for appointment type characteristics. Both
models will have attendance as the dependent variable
and a randomization group dummy and user/appoint-
ment type characteristics as covariates along with inter-
action terms for the randomization group dummy and
the covariates. The interpretation of the interaction
terms will then be the effect modification of the covari-
ates, which is the same as a differentiated effect of fines
on different users/types of appointments. A significance
level of 0.05 will be used for all analyses.
Analysis of cost-effectiveness and budget impact
The primary outcome measure will be adopted from the
effectiveness analysis (proportion of nonattendance), and
the cost parameter will include the net cost of the inter-
vention on the consequences to productivity. The incre-
mental cost effectiveness ratio for the healthcare sector
will be analyzed to illustrate the impact of the fines on
technical efficiency [20]. The main result will thus be the
extra cost of preventing an extra user from not attend-
ing, which will be reported as a mean value with 95 %
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confidence intervals, given that both nominator and de-
nominator are positive; otherwise, the net benefit frame-
work will be adopted to accommodate negative
components of the ratio [21, 22]. A sensitivity analysis
will be conducted to assess the robustness of the results
with respect to methodological choices. The cost-
effectiveness analysis will be supplemented with a simple
budget impact analysis that considers the revenue from
fines less the collection costs [23].
Missing data is not relevant when using register-based
data.
The data will be handled in accordance with the Data
Protection Act, and the establishment of a research
register was approved by the Legal Office at the Central
Denmark Region (journal no. 1-16-02-288-15), which
has been delegated the authority to handle local research
projects by the national Data Protection Agency. Only
the researchers authoring this protocol will have access
to the data.
Discussion
The introduction of fines for nonattendance in Danish
outpatient clinics has been debated for more than a dec-
ade, and stakeholders such as the Danish Regions, Da-
nish Patients, and the Danish Medical Association have
been involved in the debate. Although the statutory
foundation was found to be present in 2004, no decision
was made to conduct the trial until 2013 [14].
The ethics of selecting a particular group of users for
nonvolunteer participation in this trial is atypical in
comparison with, e.g., clinical experiments where partici-
pants are normally only included on giving informed
consent. On the other hand, the process of selection re-
flects the typical rationale for an experimental test in
that the effect is examined before eventual implementa-
tion to the entire sector. An alternative would be to test
the effect of fines on the entire healthcare user popula-
tion and let users decide whether they will agree to par-
ticipate in the trial. This was not considered for two
main reasons. First, it would require an unrealistic
amount of resources to set the intervention up for all
healthcare sector providers, and second, we would ex-
pect selection into the trial that would introduce severe
challenges in terms of external validity. The trial design
decisions can thus be said to reflect the ethical principle
of utilitarianism [24].
The organization, Danish Patients, was invited to par-
ticipate as a reference group for the project, which the
organization declined. However, the organization agreed
to be available for comments and sharing viewpoints on
the project.
The main argument in favor of fines has been that
public resources should be utilized efficiently. Propo-
nents argue that nonattendance leads to excess labor
costs as well as unused facilities and equipment, which
will again lead to longer waiting times and/or a more
stressful work environment for the staff. Opponents’
main argument is that the use of fines could violate the
fundamental value of the Danish healthcare system of
free and equal access, and that it provides a threat to the
patient-health professional relationship, which should be
independent of financial interests [14]. Nevertheless, a
number of general population surveys as well as staff ex-
pressions in the general media reflect a positive attitude
toward the introduction of fines, and similar fines are
already used elsewhere in the public sector [14].
According to neoclassical economic theory, users will
attend an appointment if the personal benefits exceed
the expected costs associated with committing an
offense [11]. Monetary fines thus influence people’s be-
havior, and, consequently, the proportion of non-
attendees will decrease when fines are introduced. This
also means that the higher the fine is, the more signifi-
cant the behavioral change will be. The level of fines in
this study is a politically set value, although it should be
noted that, ideally, the dose–response relationship be-
tween fine level and nonattendance should have been
assessed empirically. The level chosen is a reflection of
what is already allowed by the collaborative agreement
between the Danish Regions and the Danish Medical As-
sociation for privately practicing specialists [15].
Also according to neoclassical economic theory, the
level of a fine will have different effect across users with
different income. The level of DKK 250 corresponds to,
e.g., a regional return ticket for the train or ten newspa-
pers. The Ministry of Health decided that this trial
should adopt this level because fines of DKK 250 are
already used elsewhere in the public sector. Estimation
of intervention costs as well as the value of improved
productivity (cost saving) is a part of the planned cost ef-
fectiveness. The revenue from fines is expected to sum
to a limited amount, as the maximum effect potential
(until nonattendance) of less than 5 % multiplied by the
DKK 250, is quickly outweighed by intervention costs.
The revenue from fines will be quantified as an eco-
nomic redistribution from those who do not attend to
those who attend, and the revenue will be discussed rela-
tive to the implications for equity and ethics.
Because the orthopedic clinic is simultaneously ex-
posed to fines and to no fines, we cannot evaluate “over-
head” provider-level consequences such as improved
productivity. In principle, we could alternatively have
randomized a number of departments to fine-based
practice versus no-fine-based practice, but this would re-
quire an unrealistic amount of trial resources and in-
volve hundreds of thousands of patients. Given this
reality, we have chosen to focus on the first-line conse-
quence of fines, namely user response to this risk of
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financial penalty. However, longer-term consequences of,
e.g., productivity or even health effects for users, could
be linked to attendance. An important limitation of this
study is that we only assess the user-level effects.
The provider-level effects are, however, being investi-
gated in a parallel, nonrandomized intervention study at
a diagnostic center of a different hospital in another city
(Diagnostic Centre at Silkeborg Regional Hospital),
which is exposed to fines for a 12-month period from
December 2015. While that study potentially suffers bias
from the nonrandomized design, the aim is to inform
relevant the provider-level effects such as production
volume, staffing, staff sick leave, ability to conform with
political targets for time to diagnosis, and overtime
work, which can be interpreted as provider-level effects
that are linked to users attending appointments.
The generalizability of the trial is restricted by the
choice of the orthopedic setting. However, given the
scale of the trial, the availability of detailed user charac-
teristics and because the orthopedic department serves
quite diverse users, we will be able to generate weights
for the effect of nonattendance that can be used to pre-
dict the effect for different user populations. What can-
not be assessed analytically, however, are the alternative
contextual characteristics such as infrastructure, culture,
and hospital characteristics. In a previous survey, nonat-
tendance rates across eight different specialties were
found to differ at the provider level, whereas the overall
level across regions was found to be similar [14]. In a re-
cent observational study at a gastroenterology outpatient
clinic, the level of nonattendance was found to be 6.1 %
after the introduction of telephone reminders [25],
which is above the historical level in the current setting.
The perspective of the trial includes national policy-
making about healthcare management. The findings of
the trial are expected to inform political decisions about
the introduction of fines as a general premise in the con-
text of Danish hospitals.
Trial status
The trial began accepting users on 1 May 2015. The de-
sign and preparation of the randomization and data pro-
tection procedures, the agreements of collaboration with
clinical department, and all ethical approvals have all
been settled. The trial closed on 1 December 2015.
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